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TU WEI-MING AND CHARLES TAYLOR  
ON EMBODIED MORAL REASONING1 
  
Andrew Tsz Wan Hung 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
While the philosophies of Tu Wei-Ming ( ), a contemporary 
Confucian Chinese scholar, and Charles Taylor, a Canadian philosopher of 
the Catholic faith, come from very different traditions, they have similar 
criticisms of modern Western society. Both of them are discontent with the 
domination of instrumental reason and disembodied rationality. They also 
agree on the embodied understanding of the self and morality. While very 
little has been written concerning Tu’s or Taylor’s theory of embodiment,2 
the comparison between their theories of embodied moral reasoning has 
never been examined. This paper will first illustrate their criticisms of 
secular modernity. Second, it will examine and compare the theory of 
embodied reason by Taylor and embodied knowing by Tu. Finally, it will 
show that, while there are some similarities between their theories, the 
differences between them can be mutually enriching.  
 
DISCONTENT WITH SECULAR MODERNITY 
 
Tu’s criticism of the marketization of everything 
 
Tu Wei-Ming, in a lecture given in Zhejiang University at 2008,3 argued that 
the Chinese community faces the challenge of globalization, a trend of 
modernization and homogenization by Western culture. After the May 
Fourth Movement,4 Tu argued, many Chinese have blindly idolized Western 
culture because of its economic and technological development. It is true 
that certain elements of Western culture are also valuable for the Chinese. 
For instance, freedom, rationality, human rights, the rule of law – these were 
Western values that have now become universal values. Nevertheless, 
justice, sympathy, responsibility and courtesy, as emphasized by Confucians 
and Asians, should also be universal values.  
 In dialogue with Western culture, Chinese people should come to 
have a deeper understanding of their own cultural heritage and be aware of 
certain problems inherited from Western culture. One of the crucial 
problems is the marketization of the economy, politics, academic life, and 
education, due to the rise of capitalism. The marketization of everything has 
led to a vulgarization of civilization, which in turn has made intellectual 
activities shallow and trivial. Academic life has lost direction. Family values 
have diminished. What is worse is the marketization of religions, in which 
many religious temples have become profit-oriented. Religious rituals have 
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become profitable activities. The spiritual aura of religion has increasingly 
faded out.  
 Many moderns see the Enlightenment as a move from the realm of 
religion to that of natural science. Such an idea rejects religion and spiritual 
matters, and has given rise to an anthropocentrism. Human beings think of 
themselves as the masters of all things. They attempt not only to understand 
nature, but to use and conquer nature, seeing nature as a tool, as a human 
resource. The operation of modern capitalist society is dominated by 
instrumental reason, which is disembodied, unsympathetic, and even cruel. 
For Tu, people today, nourished by the Enlightenment, may have knowledge, 
but lack wisdom. Thus, it is important for the Chinese to retrieve their 
cultural heritage, in particular to restore Mencius’s idea of the sense of 
commiseration (, ceyin zhixin).  
 
Taylor’s theory of excarnation of religious practices, morality and the 
self 
 
Charles Taylor also generally agrees that the primacy of instrumental reason 
is one of important sources of “malaises of modernity.”5 It forces societies, 
as well as individuals, to focus on instrumental reason – something that we 
should never do in serious moral deliberation. The primacy of instrumental 
reason partly arises from the idea of the disengaged human subject, 
proposed by Descartes. Descartes supposes that we are essentially 
disengaged reason; we are pure mind, distinct from our bodies. Our ordinary 
embodied way of seeing ourselves generates confusion. Furthermore, in A 
Secular Age,6 Taylor raises another problem of modernity: that is, the trend 
of “excarnation” (SA, p. 288). Taylor argues that the religious reform 
movement, which began in the Axial age, leads to the trend of the 
disenchantment of the world. The shift from enchantment to disenchantment 
effects a transformation of religious practice, morality, and the self. This 
transformation is what Taylor calls “excarnation.”  
 Excarnation means a shift from an embodied form of life to a form 
of idea. In other words, the excarnation of religious practices refers to the 
transformation from “embodied, ‘enfleshed’ forms of religious life, to those 
which are more ‘in the head’” (SA, p. 533). In older societies, rituals 
integrated people, through desire and its fulfillment, with nature and the 
cosmos (SA, p. 613). However, excarnation is a change from a more 
embodied religious life, in which the presence of the sacred is experienced 
and enacted in ritual, into one that is more in the mind, where the 
connection with God enters an endorsement of our religiously defined 
political identity, or sees God as a moral source supporting our ethical life 
(SA, p. 553).  
 Taylor sees excarnation as having three dimensions. First, the 
ethical dimension tends to deny bodily desire, seeing it as a lust that 
alienates us. The second is the disenchanted dimension which denies the 
deep resonance of these desires with the spiritual world. The third is the 
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disengaged stance towards self and body.   
 The trend of excarnation of religious practices has also influenced 
the development of ethical theory. “Enlightened” ethics today, whether in 
the Humean or Kantian stream, is very theory-oriented. We start with our 
head, and rely on a disengaged understanding of experience and ethics. We 
have excluded the possibility that “part of being good is opening ourselves 
to certain feelings; either the horror at infanticide, or agape as a gut feeling” 
(SA, p. 555).  
 This movement has also brought about the objectification of the 
self in the modern world. Such objectification can be seen in the current 
medicalization of the body, which takes an objectifying standpoint and 
finally devalues our living body. We are trained to see ourselves in an 
objectifying way. This has not only degraded our lived experience, but also 
changes our phenomenology of our lived experience, in which certain 
instinctive feelings are suppressed while biochemical, medical facets of life 
have been prioritized. Unfortunately, the tracks of the objectification have 
been covered and we do not see that we are being led to see and feel 
ourselves in different ways (SA, pp. 740-1).  
 For Taylor, the network of Christian agape can only be established 
in an embodiment in which agape is released from instinct. However, the 
corruption by excarnation takes us ever farther away from the network of 
agape. We can no longer understand this gut feeling as we go along with 
these alienating self-images. We can comprehend Christian doctrine of 
Resurrection only if we have overcome excarnation and take embodiment 
seriously.  
 
TAYLOR’S EMBODIED SELF 
 
The transcendental argument for the engaged and embodied self 
 
The move of excarnation violates Taylor’s understanding of a human being 
as an embodied agent, as revealed in his earlier writing. In his earlier work, 
following Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Taylor used a transcendental 
argument to support the idea of embodied agency. The transcendental 
argument also challenges modern representational epistemology and the 
disengaged stance of the self and, therefore, the move to excarnation as well. 
 The transcendental argument was brought into philosophical 
prominence by the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant thought that in order to 
distinguish between experiencing an objective order of things (the noise I 
hear in the neighboring woods) and experiencing a merely inner subjective 
order (the buzzing in my head), our sensation must have a “dimension of 
‘aboutness’.” This necessary condition will later be called ‘intentionality,’ 
in the Brentano-Husserl tradition (PA, p. 72). Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
follow this pioneering Kantian form of transcendental argument, further 
exploring the conditions of intentionality to undermine a belief in the 
disengaged subject. 
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 Based on his reflections on the conditions of intentionality, 
Heidegger argues that we are “first and mostly” (zunächst und zumeisti) 
agents in the world. Thus, we are indispensably engaged as agents coping 
with things. We could never really “form disinterested representations any 
other way” (PA, p. 11). For Merleau-Ponty, “our primary access to the 
world is through perception, and this is essentially that of an embodied 
agent who is engaged with the world” (PA, p. 25). I am always perceiving 
the world from where I am, through my senses. 7  Another feature of 
embodied agency is teleological in nature. In the standard notions of 
mechanistic materialism, our body is just a machine which can be 
manipulated and objectified by the operations of consciousness. However, 
for Taylor, as the subject is inevitably in the world, if we want to describe 
the state of a person, the characterization has to involve certain features of 
the world which have meaning for us. In other words, one cannot be 
indifferent to those features of the world. The features have meaning for us 
because we are teleological beings. We have purposes, goals, and 
aspirations, and these features touch us.8 
 Taylor claims that the exploration of intentionality undermines the 
disengaged perspective and the entire epistemological position, because our 
representation of things is always grounded in the way we deal with those 
things. In other words, in our understanding, we are always engaged in 
dealing with those things. Basically, the problem of disengaged 
consciousness is that it leaves out a concern for the body and the other, and 
the role of these in constituting the self. As Taylor states, it is possible to 
draw a line between “my picture of an object” and the object. However, it is 
impossible to draw the line between “my dealing with an object” and the 
object (PA, p. 12). For instance, it may make sense to ask us to focus on 
imagining a football, even in its absence; but it would be absurd to ask us to 
play football without a football. The actions involved in the game can’t be 
done without the object. The action of our understanding is just the same. 
Understanding and perceiving are different from imagining. Our 
understanding of the world is an action which is grounded in our dealing 
with it, rather than ultimately based on representation.  
 
Criticisms of the behaviourist approach and the positivist approach in 
human science 
 
Concurrent with the rise of natural science and modern epistemology, 
behaviourist and positivist theories were the norms of the social scientific 
approach during the 1970 and 80s.9 These approaches tended to adopt the 
criteria of abstraction and neutrality in studying human beings, and a 
morality that sidelined the purpose and intentionality of the embodied agent. 
They attempted to define the paradigm of social science according to the 
model of natural science. Taylor criticizes such approaches as sterile; they 
cannot come to understand important dimensions of human life (PHS, p. 21). 
This is because the criteria of social science theories can never be based on 
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the degree they enable us to predict, as natural sciences do. In his article 
“Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” (PHS, pp. 15-57), Taylor 
elaborates three fundamental reasons why he disagrees with social science 
adopting the paradigm of natural science: 
 
1. Human life and society are open systems. It is impossible to shield the 
domain of human events from external interference (PHS, p. 55).  
2. Most human behaviours, values and motivations cannot be quantified 
and measured as natural sciences do; they can only be understood by 
interpretation.  
3. Most fundamentally, according to Taylor, man is a self-defining (or self-
interpreting) animal. Changes in his self-definition also change what 
man is, such that he has to be understood in different terms.  
 
The first reason for Taylor’s disagreement is obvious. Social scientists can 
never put human beings or society into a laboratory for investigation as 
natural scientists do. It is impossible for social scientists to single out 
several factors as variables for investigation and delineate all other factors 
by setting them as constants. But the second and the third reasons are 
related to his theory of self-interpreting embodied agency, which has to be 
further elaborated. 
 
Embodied reasoning 
 
For Taylor, with the idea of embodied agency, one’s emotions, desires and 
actions also carry purposes and meanings for that person. Thus, to articulate 
the underlying meaning of our emotions and actions is an important part of 
self-understanding. Taylor’s concept of reason, I would argue, is a kind of 
embodied reasoning.  
 In “Self-Interpreting Animals”, Taylor maintains that many of our 
actions, motivations and emotions involve experiencing our situation as 
having a certain “import” or significance, which is of value to desires or 
purposes of a human subject (HAL, p. 48). Thus, most of what is important 
is subject-referring. The implication of the concept of subject-referring, 
import-attributing emotions is obvious: instead of conceiving emotion as an 
irrational obstacle to true knowledge, Taylor sees our bodily emotions and 
actions as the medium through which we can understand the self and others. 
So, to understand the self, we cannot be detached from the body; we have to 
engage with it. Since our subject-referring imports are irreducible, we have 
to grasp them through articulations in language. Through articulation, we 
can sometimes go deeper into our emotions and actions, and articulate more 
clearly what is hidden in our desires, and deepen our understanding of 
emotion. Such deeper understanding of emotion and actions through 
articulation may be, in turn, constitutive to our emotion and actions, and 
sometimes may call for further articulation.  
 For instance, as our emotion is “a response to the situation’s 
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bearing the relevant import” (HAL, p. 49), one cannot have a feeling – for 
instance, a feeling of remorse – unless one has a certain understanding of 
right or wrong. However, we sometimes feel remorse even without being 
able to fully articulate why what we did was wrong. In these cases, we may 
seek to articulate further. In further articulations, if we come to see that our 
sense of wrongdoing is unfounded, then the remorse may dissipate 
altogether. These kinds of understanding are what the mechanistic, 
reductive approach cannot attain. So our emotion and actions, and 
articulation by language, are mutually constitutive. We are impelled from 
time to time to interpret ourselves, and we are always embedded in our own 
interpretations. So Taylor says, we are “self-interpreting animals”, because 
we are partly constituted by our continuous self-interpretation. Further, as 
our self-interpretation is largely determined by the form of the human body 
and is always mediated through our bodily emotions, desires and actions, 
Taylor’s interpretative approach is a kind of embodied reasoning. It engages 
bodily actions and emotions, to find out their underlying significance and 
their relationship to personal identity, rather than to treat our body as an 
object – something which neglects our lived experience.  
 Furthermore, language exists and is maintained only in a 
community. We are brought up through conversations with those who are 
significant for us, and we understand ourselves through dialogue and 
communication with others. We learn our languages of moral and spiritual 
discernment from them. The meanings of the words are therefore inter-
subjective. When we discuss something, the object is not simply for me and 
only that which happens for you; instead we make it an object for us 
together. Therefore, embodied reasoning is inevitably communitarian in 
nature. There is no investigation of the self which can be taken without 
reference to the surrounding culture. 
 For Taylor, grasping inter-subjective meaning is crucial for better 
understanding human behaviour in society, because many social practices 
inevitably require common understanding. For instance, negotiation and 
bargaining is the usual practice in Western democratic politics. Both are 
based on a contractual notion that is connected with distinct autonomous 
individuals and the voluntary nature of their relations. But in the traditional 
Japanese village, the villagers’ relations to one another were largely based 
on a strong form of consensus; hence, they had no idea about negotiation 
and bargaining. Relations would be damaged and villagers would be upset, 
if the connected parties were separated. The Western notion of bargaining 
has no place there. This shows that the vocabulary of a given social 
dimension is usually based on the form of social practice. The vocabulary 
would not make sense in situations where certain ranges of practices did not 
exist. These ranges of practices simply could not exist without the 
prevalence of certain relevant vocabularies. This shows, then, a mutual 
dependence between the language and social practice. The meanings of 
these terms are, then, inter-subjective meanings (PHS, pp. 33-4).  
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 In A Secular Age, Taylor further points out that our bodily emotions 
and desires are the medium which bear the aura of transcendence (SA, p. 
288). The meaning involved in our desire is, to a certain extent, spiritual. 
Somewhere, deep down in our heart, we will feel drawn to recognize and 
relate to our spiritual reality. That is why even people who are very 
successful in ordinary human flourishing can still feel unease. Unfortunately, 
due to the trend of the medicalization of the body, such unease can only be 
understood as pathological. The aspirations of transcendence are held back 
(SA, pp. 620-1). For Taylor, this is a kind of mutilation. Thus, for Taylor, we 
are required to rediscover the sense of nature and bodily feeling that can be 
pathways in our contact with fullness.  
 
The Subtler Language 
 
To respond to the trend of disengagement and excarnation by which we 
have lost contact with the natural world and the spiritual domain, Taylor 
refers to a number of spiritual conversions or "epiphanic" experiences in 
Catholic artists and poets, including Vaclav Havel, Charles Peguy, and 
Gerard Manley Hopkins (SA, pp. 728-72). For Taylor, art and poetry is a 
key element to recovering an aesthetic dimension in contemporary life (SA, 
p. 755). The language of poetry makes better sense of possible meanings 
about spiritual matters. Through using language and symbols, spiritual 
matters enter our world. Poets establish meaning by creating symbols and, 
so, poetry is potentially world-making.  
 Understanding poetics in its performative sense opens up a new 
domain of possibilities. For instance, spiritual matters enter our world 
through the Bible and other related literature by means of the term “spirit.” 
Spiritual reality is fixed in narrative and doctrine. However, the new poetics 
brings us a reflexive turn which directs our attention towards the 
manifestation of the events narrated in the Bible. This reflexive turn brings 
an awareness of the conditions for making the spiritual manifest. So the new 
poetic language can help to find a way back to the God of Abraham. We can 
see this in Hopkins and Eliot. For instance, Hopkins’ poetry is a fusion of 
two spiritual sources: articulating experience of God and making sense of 
the action of God. These two elements transform in such a synthesis, which 
gives a deeper meaning to the experience of transcendence and a new kind 
of experiential reality to the work of God (SA, p. 757). 
 These transformations, by transcendent experience, in some sense 
contest the limits of generally accepted language. They appeal to a new 
“subtler language” which can point us beyond ordinary immanent realities. 
The arts can turn the reality of hidden depths into an epiphany of the divine. 
Through artistic expression, the convert’s insights go beyond the boundaries 
of the prevalent understandings of immanent order, reaching a larger, more 
encompassing order of God by inventing a new language or literary style 
(SA, p. 732).  
 
206    Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 
 
TU’S EMBODIED KNOWING 
 
Moral knowledge vs. empirical knowledge 
 
In his article, “On ‘Embodied Knowing’ – the Implications of Moral 
Knowledge in the Confucian Tradition,” Tu Wei-Ming argues that moral 
reasoning in the Confucian tradition is a kind of “embodied knowing” (´¶c
tizhi).10 Tu also rejects the use of the scientific method in the investigation 
of humanity. Following Zhang Zai (²·), a Neo-Confucian philosopher, Tu 
emphasizes the distinction between moral knowledge (¸¹, dexing 
zhizhi) and empirical knowledge ( º» , wenjian zhizhi). While 
empirical knowledge derives ideas or information from observation through 
our sense organs, it is not necessarily embodied in one’s body. Moreover, 
moral knowledge is not derived from empirical observation. While it cannot 
be totally separated from empirical knowledge, moral knowledge is a kind 
of bodily experience; it must be based on reflection on one’s bodily practice 
and experience.11  
 Moral knowledge is a kind of bodily experiential knowledge (´¼, 
tiyan). Tu uses a Chinese idiom as a metaphor: “only the person who drinks 
knows whether water is hot or cold.”12 It is similar to the English idiom, 
“only the wearer knows where the shoes hurt.” Ontologically speaking, the 
expression of the moral subject is necessarily true and honest. Such a claim 
is a priori rather than a posteriori. However, from the practical perspective, 
if we do not maintain the practice of self-cultivation, the moral knowledge 
of the subject would finally be depleted.13  
 Accordingly, embodied knowing is a kind of transformative act.14 
Such bodily experiential knowledge can lead to self-transformation. It aims 
at the identification of knowledge and action. Thus, apart from intellectual 
understanding, embodied knowing also stresses the transformative effect of 
knowledge, that is, the renovation of one’s disposition.15  Such knowing 
must be beneficial to the body and leads to a practical implication of 
embodiment, that is, how to embody our moral knowledge. It is a kind of 
self-consciousness which is necessary for moral practice.16 For Confucius, 
the highest human achievement by moral self-cultivation is to become what 
Tu calls, “ren-ren” (½t), that is a man who embodies ren (½); and such 
embodiment must have a concrete manifestation in the observance of rites 
(p, li).17 
 
Knowing self, others, and Heaven 
 
Embodied knowing is a kind of self-knowing by the moral subject. Such 
knowledge is derived naturally, through the subject’s self-understanding, 
rather than by objectifying others. The Confucian discipline of self-
cultivation (T¾±, weij izhixue) is not through a kind of disengaged 
introspection; rather it is realized through social practice in a complicated 
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social network. Confucius’s understanding of human dignity is not atomistic; 
rather one’s personality is established in the network of mutual support and 
encouragement. For a man of perfect virtue, he, “wishing to be established 
himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he 
seeks also to enlarge others” (Analects, 6:30).18  
 Knowing others also inevitably operates in social networks. Such 
knowing is a dynamic process. For instance, when we attempt to know, to 
understand a person, and to be friend with him/her, we have to go beyond 
detached empirical observation. We have to know the other’s dispositions 
and character through dialogue and interaction with him or her. Embodied 
knowing is a kind of empathic sensual perception; it rejects the 
objectification of others, be they things or humans. Embodied knowing can 
accommodate and integrate everything in the world, and let all these things 
become something that is non-objectified in our mind.19   
 Tu stresses that Confucian human science (¿Àt±, rujia 
zhiren zhixue) is an inter-disciplinary study. It attempts to integrate the study 
of culture, psychology, religion, and hermeneutics. It overcomes the 
framework of the subject/object dichotomy and value neutrality. We acquire 
insights about human nature from reading books, understanding the heritage 
of our traditions, spiritual communication with others, value regeneration, 
and the study of moral self-transformation.20 
 Finally, embodied knowing cannot be separated from the 
framework of unity and harmony between man and Heaven (2tÁ, 
tienren heyi). According to Zhang Zai, everything is included in Heaven; 
there is nothing which can be detached from the scope of Heaven. Zhang 
Zai’s idea of “great heart”(e, taxin) is based on one’s endeavor to know 
heaven and nature. The way of Heaven and the way of Humanity is 
continuous and united. It is, what Tu calls, “The Continuity of Being”.21 
Everyone can be connected to Heaven by one’s nature.  
 According to The Doctrine of the Mean, by Zisi (&Â ), the 
grandson of Confucius, “What Heaven has conferred is called THE 
NATURE”. For Tu, such an understanding of Heaven and nature necessarily 
leads to the demand by the person of sincereity to: 
 
development to his nature. Able to give its full development to his 
own nature, he can do the same to the nature of other men. Able to 
give its full development to the nature of other men, he can give 
their full development to the natures of animals and things. Able to 
give their full development to the natures of creatures and things, 
he can assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven 
and Earth. Able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of 
Heaven and Earth, he may with Heaven and Earth form a ternion.22  
 
Thus, to know the way of Heaven is not to disengage and observe, rather it 
is to reflect, based on bodily experience by the self.  
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Four levels of human subjectivity 
 
Tu’s idea of embodied knowing is based on his theory of subjectivity. Tu’s 
understanding of subjectivity includes body (Ã, shen), mind (, xin), soul 
(Ä, ling) and spirit (Å, shen) – four different levels.23 According to Tu, the 
foundation of Confucius’s moral concern, shown in Analects, is an 
embodied person, a human being who is lively, vivacious, sensitive, 
emotional, with flesh and bone, and who can feel pain; rather than simply a 
disengaged, disembodied soul.24 In short, it is an embodied person with 
sensitivity and emotion. Embodied knowing is an experiential knowledge 
based on the integration of these four different levels.  
 
i. Body 
For Confucians, self-cultivation (Æ¾, xiuji) literally means “nourishing the 
body” (ÆÃ, xiushen). Our body includes five sense organs, providing us 
five sensual experiences: vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Confucian 
teaching emphasizes nourishing our bodily senses through the Six Arts (Ç
È , liuyi); they are rites, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and 
mathematics. To nourish one’s body is not simply to exercise and maintain 
one’s health; rather, it is to aestheticize human life through the practice of 
rituals (p, li) and music (É, yue). These practices, Confucians emphasize, 
help to cultivate one’s disposition, to facilitate one’s thinking and 
controlling of emotion. 25  Such discipline must aim at achieving one’s 
embodiment of virtues (`Ã´, yishen tizhi).26  
 Embodied knowing means to have bodily experience or to think in 
terms of a particular situation. Through the term “embodied knowing”, we 
can see that cognitive activity is based on integration of body and mind.27 
As Confucius considers ren (½) as a restoration of ritual (p, li) through 
self-cultivation, he orders his students to see, listen, speak and act in 
accordance with rituals (Analects, 12:1). The process of learning to be 
human is to pursue a civilized mode of conduct by the ritualization of the 
body, to learn to express the self through bodily action. It is the result of a 
discipline of what the Song-Ming Confucians call, “tizhiyushen” (
), that is “to embody it [the experience of each of the six senses] in the 
body”. 28  Therefore, Tu emphasizes, the body is not a kind of private 
property. “We do not own our bodies; we become our bodies and through 
that process of becoming we learn to fully realize ourselves as concrete 
living human beings.”29  
 
ii. Mind 
Mind is a rational faculty. It attempts to integrate our different sensual 
experiences. 30  According to the Song-Ming Confucians, Mencius’s 
Confucian anthropology is the study of heart/mind (¶cxin). As Tu states, 
“Mencius stresses the spiritual resources inherent in human nature as both 
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the theoretical ground and the practical process of self-realization. He 
focuses his attention on the embodiment of the heart-mind as the spacious 
dwelling and the broad highway of profound persons (&, junzi).”31  
 For Mencius, there is something in every human mind that is a 
given reality and endowed by Heaven as the defining feature of being 
human. It is not learned or acquired, and can never be subject to external 
control.32 It is “the power of the will for self-realization, a power never 
totally lost, although it is conceivable that it can be forever latent.”33 This 
power is what Mencius calls, “vast, flowing qi” (ÊËÌ, haoranzhiqi) 
(Mencius, 2A: 2)34 or vast, flowing vital force or vital energy. This vital 
force is great and strong. “If one nourishes it with uprightness and does not 
injure it, it will fill the space between Heaven and earth” (Mencius, 2A: 2). 
As Mencius said, “He who has exhausted all his mental constitution 
(heart/mind) knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven. To 
preserve one’s mental constitution, and nourish one's nature, is the way to 
serve Heaven” (Mencius, 7A: 1). This qi is “the companion of rightness and 
the Way, in the absence of which, it starves. It is born from an accumulation 
of rightness rather than appropriated through an isolated display. If one’s 
actions cause the mind to be disquieted, it starves” (Mencius, 2A: 2).35 Thus, 
in the process of realizing humanity and rightness in the world through self-
cultivation, profound persons focus on tapping their own internal energy to 
achieve the goal.  
 For Mencius, everyone has the potential of acquiring the four 
virtues: benevolence (½, ren), propriety (Í, yi), observance of rites (p, li) 
and wisdom (Î , zhi). These virtues are not acquired by socialization. 
Moreover, our mind is not a tabula rasa that has no innate moral knowledge. 
Rather, these virtues result from our cultivation of four germinations (Ï , 
siduan, four kinds of universal predispositions) in human nature. They are 
the sense of commiseration (ÐÑ, ceyin zhixin), the sense of shame 
(ÒÓ, xiuwu zhixin), a reverential attitude toward others (ÔÕ, 
cirang zhixin), and the sense of rightness and wrongness (7Ö, shifei 
zhixin). So humans, as living persons, have emotions; they can feel pain and 
are able to make judgments.36 These senses are both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for self-realization. Among them, the sense of 
commiseration (a combination of sympathy and empathy) is the most 
essential feature of humanity. By doing our utmost with our mind, we can 
extend our sympathy and empathy not only towards other persons, but 
beyond; our influence “flows abroad, above and beneath, like that of 
Heaven and Earth.” (Mencius, 7A: 13). As the sense of commiseration is 
unlimited, in principle, it can embody countless things, including an ever-
expanding network of human relationships, and even Heaven and earth, in 
our sympathy and empathy. As Tu states,  
 
This faith in the human potential for understanding Heaven through 
self-knowledge and the human capacity for self-knowledge through 
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the cultivation of the heart-mind is predicated on the sensitivity of 
the body both as a spacious dwelling and as a broad highway for 
our ultimate personal realization.37 
 
iii. Soul and Spirit 
Soul is the extension of mind. It is expressed in terms of wisdom, a kind of 
awareness in the existential situation. Spirit is the state of transcendence. It 
is the ultimate goal of self-cultivation. According to Tu, the soul is concrete, 
definite, with fixed shape and direction; while the spirit is indefinite and 
hardly traceable. It is just like the relation between body and mind, in which 
body is concrete and mind is abstract.38 In Mencius, 
 
A man who commands our liking is what is called a good man. He 
whose goodness is part of himself is what is called real man. He 
whose goodness has been filled up is what is called a beautiful man. 
He whose completed goodness is brightly displayed is what is 
called a great man. When this great man exercises a transforming 
influence, he is what is called a sage. When the sage is beyond our 
knowledge, he is what is called a spirit-man. (Mencius, 7B: 7)  
 
For Tu, this verse shows the stages of development of self-transcendence. 
The stage from goodness to realness belongs to the ascending level from 
body to mind. Ascending from beauty to greatness occurs at the movement 
from the mind to the soul. Sage-spirit is the product of the ascending status 
from the soul to the spirit. So, in Confucian self-elevation, one cannot 
detach oneself from the body. Rather, one must use the body, so that one can 
learn about mind, and then be aware of soul, and finally rise to the level of 
spirit. This is a process of creative self-transformation. 
 For Tu, embodied knowing is not only exercised in meditation, but 
also in our ordinary life. Through ritual practice, we expand our humanity 
by establishing a reciprocal communication with the outside world, so that 
we can experience a kind of union with the cosmos; as Mencius asserts, “all 
things are there in me” (Mencius, 7A: 4). By exercising embodied knowing 
through social practice, the embodiment of virtue and of the ritual-musical 
cultivated harmonious world (pÉ×eØÙ , liyue jiaohua de 
tatong shijie) can then be established.39  
 
COMPARISON AND EVALUATION 
 
If we compare Taylor’s and Tu’s philosophy of the body, we can see some 
similarities between them. They both criticize the domination of 
instrumental reason and the disembodied rationality of the Enlightenment. 
Their view of the body has both instrumental and constitutive senses. On the 
one hand, the human body, as an instrument of moral knowledge, helps 
human beings to achieve self-understanding, so that human nature is 
explored; the goals of human beings, the importamce of the relationship 
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with the community, and the sense of transcendence are also illuminated. 
On the other hand, our body is also constitutive to our self-understanding. 
Morality and values, derived by embodied reasoning, are inevitably bodily 
knowledge. Such knowledge is constitutive to our self-understanding as 
embodied beings. We can never disengage ourselves from our body, or 
replace our body by machines, without distorting our self-understanding. To 
acknowledge our embodied nature is to recognize that we are embedded in a 
particular historical, social, and cultural community. To understand the self 
and others, our moral reflection must be based on our active participation in 
the community, rather than a kind of disengaged mediation. Moreover, apart 
from natural science and analytical philosophy, the arts, literature, music, 
religion, and social rituals are also important sources for our investigation of 
humanity. Furthermore, both men stress that our embodied perception and 
reasoning involves the sense of transcendence.  
 Although the moral epistemology of both stresses the significance 
of embodiment, Tu’s account of bodily moral epistemology seems to have 
certain gaps. Tu bases his reflection mainly on Confucian tradition and, at 
times, his theory seems to verge on the mystical and the instinctive. His 
argument for the a priori nature of moral knowledge seems to beg the 
question. His distinction of soul and spirit remains obscure. His analogy of 
the distinction of soul and spirit with the distinction of body and mind 
seems to be misleading, because body/mind distinction is a difference 
between material and immaterial, whereas both soul and spirit are 
immaterial. Tu has also not provided an account of why we are embodied 
rather than disembodied. His distinction of moral knowledge and empirical 
knowledge is mainly analytical, based on an explanation and reflection on 
Zhang Zai’s theory, rather than being argumentative in nature. Basically, he 
has not offered an account of why morality cannot be attained by empirical 
knowledge.  
 Nevertheless, in respect of a philosophical foundation, I would 
argue that Taylor’s theory can supplement Tu’s embodied knowing in the 
area of moral epistemology. Taylor’s transcendental argument of 
embodiment and his exploration of intentionality can provide an ontological 
foundation for human embodiment. His criticism of the behaviourist and 
positivist approaches, and his argument of embodied interpretative 
reasoning also offers a persuasive philosophical argument for Tu’s 
distinction between moral and empirical knowledge. Nevertheless, Taylor’s 
theory of embodiment focuses too much on moral epistemology, and its 
practical implications seem to be neglected. 
 In the areas of marketization and the primacy of instrumental 
reason, Taylor’s idea of excarnation provides a fresh perspective on the 
deficiency of contemporary disembodied culture. Ironically, while Taylor 
criticizes this feature of secular society as a kind of excarnation, his theory 
of embodiment itself remains too cerebral. Taylor is right to say that our 
emotions and desires involve value judgments that have to be articulated 
through the language of a particular community. His argument that arts and 
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poetry are a subtler language that has an epiphanic nature is illuminative. 
However, all of these explorations focus on conceptual knowledge rather 
than on practice. Admittedly, to claim that Taylor has totally neglected the 
social implication of embodiment would be unfair, because his 
communitarian political theory is mainly based on his theory of the 
embodied self. However, his political theory is mainly concerned with 
criticism of atomism, liberal neutrality, the significance of cultural 
community, and the common good. It does not provide many practical 
guidelines on individual conduct and self-cultivation.  
 With respect to individual practice, Tu’s emphasis on the relation of 
embodied knowing and self-cultivation provides an important complement 
to Taylor’s theory. Tu stresses the transformative effects of knowledge and 
the renovation of one’s disposition, which finally leads to the realization of 
ren, with a concrete manifestation of ritual observance and embodiment of 
virtues. For Tu, the body, as an instrument, not only helps us to know about 
morality, but also lets human beings, as Heaven’s co-creators, be involved 
in the great transformation by communicating with all modalities of being, 
so that we can realize the ultimate human goal, and sustain and enrich 
nature in ordinary life. Such a view of knowledge not only stresses the 
identification of knowing and acting, but also the transformation of being. 
For Tu, I would argue, moral knowledge is not simply intellectual or 
experiential, but also leads to existential embodiment. Such knowledge 
includes both conceptual and experiential understanding, but goes beyond 
both. It is a capability to realize what one conceptually and experientially 
understands through his or her bodily actions. This is the ultimate stage of 
embodied knowing. Furthermore, such practice has social and cosmological 
implications.  
 Through self-cultivation, Confucianism emphasizes that we should 
establish and enlarge others, and even the whole cosmos. By participating in 
ritual and intellectual and spiritual life, the body adapts and embraces the 
world, which generates the possibility of the union with the whole cosmos. 
Although Taylor also stresses the transformative nature of religion, its 
relation to embodiment remains unexplored. In contrast, Tu’s emphasis on 
the integration of knowing, doing, and being, and the enlargement from the 
self to the universe, seem to reflect a more holistic view of the body. At least 
the Confucian’s emphasis on ritual practice provides a more fully embodied 
understanding of the moral self. 
 Finally, both Tu and Taylor agree that our body can act as a conduit 
by which we can communicate with and be connected to the aura of 
transcendence, although their underlying metaphysical assumptions are very 
different. Taylor’s philosophy is deeply influenced by his Catholic faith in 
which God and human beings are very different in nature. Our knowledge 
of God is mainly derived from God’s revelation. Human beings are finite. 
Therefore, at best, we can conceive of an infinite God in an analogical way. 
However, according to Tu’s thesis of the continuity of being, we are integral 
parts of Heaven, Earth, and a myriad of things. Human beings are intimately 
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connected with nature on the one hand and Heaven on the other. In short, 
human beings form a trinitarian relation with Heaven and Earth.40 As human 
nature is imparted by Heaven, it is impossible to conceive humans as 
alienated from Heaven in any essential way. As Tu states, “the relationship 
between Heaven and man is not that of creator and creature but one mutual 
fidelity; and the only way for man to know Heaven is to penetrate deeply 
into his own ground of being.”41  Thus, briefly speaking, the Confucian 
religious view is a kind of pantheism, or what Tu calls “anthropocosmic”42, 
meaning that “there is implicit mutuality, constant communication, and 
dynamic interaction between the anthropological world and the cosmic 
order.” 43  For Confucians, any inquiry into religion must begin with a 
reflection on the problem of human being, rather than one acquired by 
transcendent revelation. Obviously, their religious views are important 
components to Tu’s and Taylor’s theories of embodied reasoning. 
Unfortunately, the current study is unable to further explore the relationship 
between embodiment and religion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has compared and shown some similarities and differences 
between Tu Wei-Ming’s and Charles Taylor’s view of embodied reasoning. 
While Taylor provides a clear ontological foundation of embodied moral 
epistemology, Tu elaborates on how we can enlarge and cultivate ourselves 
by bodily practice. I have demonstrated that these two theories, although 
based on very different traditional backgrounds, can be mutually enriching. 
Furthermore, their respective theories of embodiment are also related to 
their religious views. In order to have a more in-depth comprehension of 
Tu’s and Taylor’s theory of embodiment, the investigation of their 
underlying metaphysical and religious views, and their relation to 
embodiment, deserves further study. 
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